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Aug./Sept. 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 7 1040-6190/$–Profiting from Socially
Beneficial Green Investment in
an Era of Global WarmingPeter Navarro is a business
professor at the University of
California at Irvine. He received his
Ph.D. from Harvard University in
986 and has written extensively on
tility regulatory matters. His latest
book is The Coming China Wars
(Financial Times, 2006). He can be
contacted via his Web site at
www.peternavarro.com.
Tom Brunetto is a Managing
Partner of the Distributed Energy
inancial Group, LLC. He is a senior
executive with over 30 years’
experience in the gas and electric
industry, with expertise in general
management, operations, product-
business development, regulation,
and sales and marketing. Brunetto
was the co-founder of the Demand
and Energy Technology Research
Consortium (DETech) and can be
reached at tbrunetto@defgllc.com.Monetizing the value of socially beneficial green
investment is complex and will play an important role in
the transformation currently sweeping through the
industry. A common or agreed-to approach has yet to be
developed, and options under consideration have
numerous barriers, the most difficult being political ones.Peter Navarro and Tom BrunettoI. IntroductionThe issues associated with
America’s heavy reliance on
large, central-station, fossil fuel
power plants are rapidly coming
to a head in the 21st Century. In
the face of increasing electricity
demand, these problems include
a looming capacity shortfall, a
heavily congested transmission
grid, and a collateral increase in
the risks of brownouts and
blackouts. Equally significantly,
carbon-based power plants in the
U.S. now are recognized as a
major contributor to global
warming, and such plants aresee front matter# 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rightsfacing a shifting regulatory
landscape that now features
policy proposals such as a carbon
tax or carbon caps.
T hree complementarysolutions have been
proposed to reduce the nation’s
reliance on carbon-based central
power. These include an
increased commitment to energy
efficiency (EE) programs, the
implementation of more
widespread demand response
(DR) tools such as real-time
pricing, and the increased
substitution of distributed
generation (DG) capacity – from
fuel cells and microturbines toreserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2007.07.008 17
The constraints
associated
with implementing
socially
beneficial green
investment are
formidable.
18solar and wind – for new central-
station power plants. For the
remainder of this article, we shall
group the three options of EE, DR,
and DG under the heading of
‘‘socially beneficial green
investment,’’ or SBGI.
T he constraints associatedwith implementing SBGI are
formidable. The traditional
average cost pricing of the
regulated utility industry does not
provide appropriate price signals
and incentives to achieve optimal
levels. Nor does the current price
structure internalize the
‘‘externality’’ benefits associated
with using SBGI to fight global
warming. Moreover, it is very
difficult to assign appropriate
values to the broader societal
benefits that are alleged, making it
difficult for either consumers or
utilities tomonetize these benefits.
Beyond these issues, there are
added problems of imperfect
information and capital and
institutional barriers to the
adoption of SBGI that must be
recognized. For example,
consumers may not have a
complete understanding of the
various technologies available to
them, e.g., photovoltaics (PV),
solar panels. Consumers may not
haveaccess to capital at fairmarket
rates even when SBGI may be
economical, while tenants who
pay their electricity bills but do not
own the property have little
incentive to undertake most forms
of SBGI.
The purpose of this article is to
examine various policy and
strategic options that might help
loosen, or lift, the constraints now1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2007 Elsholding the observed levels of
SBGI below what is socially and
economically optimal.II. Projected ShortagesElectricity consumption now
accounts for roughly one-third of
U.S. energy consumption.
Moreover, electricity’s share in
the energy mix is rising as our
homes and businesses becomemore electrified in a high-tech
world. As a result of increased
demand, and as the above excerpt
indicates, the North American
Electric Reliability Council
(NERC) is forecasting significant
power plant capacity shortfalls.1
I n addition, NERC has warnedof an equally significant
shortfall in transmission capacity:
‘‘While peak demand for power is
projected to increase by 19 percent
over the next 10 years, total
transmission miles are projected
to increase by less than 7 percent
over the same period’’ and
‘‘without expanded transmission
system investment, grid
congestionwill increase.’’ In someevier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.situations, ‘‘this can lead to
supply shortages and involuntary
customer interruptions.’’2
Beyond looming shortages in
power plant and transmission
capacity, there is the issue of
global warming. There is an
emerging consensus within the
scientific community that global
warming is a very significant
problem and that carbon dioxide
emissions are the principal cause
of global warming. In the coming
years, there is likely to be growing
pressure on the electric utility
sector to reduce its carbon
emissions; and policy proposals
already being debated include
both carbon taxes and carbon caps
with emission trading systems.III. The Economics of
Undersupplying EE, DR,
DGEconomic theory predicts that,
in the face of incremental
demand/capacity needs, utilities
will continue to add SBGI at the
margin up to the point where the
marginal cost of SBGI equals the
avoided cost of traditional
capacity. Over time, the utilities’
avoided costs are likely to risewith
increasing pressures for
environmental regulation, rising
fossil fuel costs, and increased
difficulties in siting large central-
station powerplants. At the same
time, the marginal costs of SBGI
are likely to continue to fall with
technological innovation and the
achievement of economies of scale
in the production of SBGI plant
and equipment, e.g., the cost oftej.2007.07.008 The Electricity Journal
Asolar panels should fall as
production increases. Therefore,
left alone, themarketwill continue
to increase its provision of SBGI.
Nonetheless, absent a proper
valuation of the social benefits of
SBGI and absent a comprehensive
set of solutions to the problems of
imperfect information and
institutional barriers, SBGI will
continue to be undersupplied
relative to the social optimum.
This, then, is our working
theory, namely, that SBGI is
undersupplied in the market
because of the various obstacles or
‘‘market failures.’’ These
obstacles or market failures are
summarized in Table 1.
I n the table, the various marketfailures are conceptually
grouped into four categories. The
first category includes problems
associated with ‘‘imperfect
information’’ whereby consumersTable 1: Market Failures Associated with a
Imperfect information
Technology issues Consume
techno
Economic issues Market p
sophis
compa
of ben
Capital constraints
Lack of access to capital Lack of a
Short-term loans Banks w
Institutional constraints
Average cost pricing Conveys
Landlord vs. tenant split Stymies
Time horizon issue Affects p
Externalities
Global warming reduction Difficult
System reliability improvement Substant
Protection against market power Difficult
ug./Sept. 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 7 1040-6190/$–ssimply may not understand the
full benefits of SBGI and therefore
may be unwilling to undertake
their costs. One problem arises
when consumers are not fully
informed as to the array of
technologies available to them,
(e.g., the latest vintage of solar
panels or PV). A second problem
arises when market participants
may not have the training or skills
to conduct the kind of
sophisticated discounted cash
flow analysis needed to compare
the upfront costs of an investment
in SBGI with its stream of benefits
over time under conditions of
significant uncertainty.
The second category of market
failure identifies various capital
constraints. Some consumers may
not have access to capital at fair
market rates to invest in economic
SBGI. Inother cases, capitalmaybe
available but the loan periodsmayn Undersupply of SBGI
rs not fully informed as to the array of
logies available to them
articipants lack skills to conduct
ticated discounted cash flow analysis to
re the upfront capital costs with a stream
efits over time
ccess at fair market rates
on’t lend long term to match payback period
wrong price signals
investment
erception of payback period
to value and monetize
ial free rider problem
to value and monetize
ee front matter# 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rightsbe too short to make the
investment economical (e.g.,
banks typically won’t provide
long term loans for solar
installation).
The third category of market
failure identifies various
institutional constraints. These
include the problems of average
cost pricing, the perverse
incentives of the landlord-tenant
split, and time horizons that do
not properly allow for payback.
With average-cost pricing,
‘‘flat’’ rates do not convey how
electricity might be valued over
time. Nor do flat rates provide any
incentives to vary electricity use in
response to changing prices. There
is also a ‘‘dead weight loss’’
associated with the loss of
efficiency from inadequate price
signals. In this particular case,
consumers who see only flat,
average cost electricity prices
wind up consuming too much
electricity in peak periods when
marginal costs are high and not
enough in non-peak periods when
marginal cost is less than average
cost. (Note, however, that in
markets such as electricity which
feature a relatively inelastic
consumer demand, this effect may
be relatively small.)
As for the perverse incentives of
the landlord–tenant split, property
owners who rent to tenants that
pay their own electricity bills are
unlikely to have the proper
incentives to undertake SBGI just
as the tenants themselves are
unlikely to bewilling to undertake
such investments in property they
do not own. On the time horizon
issue, even property owners whoreserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2007.07.008 19
Both economists
and accountants
have a much
more difficult
time putting a
value on the
benefits of the good.
20occupy their own property may
not bewilling to undertake SBGI if
they believe they are going to sell
their propertyprior to reaching the
break-even payback period.
F inally, the fourth, andperhaps most important,
category of market failure
acknowledges the presence of
substantial ‘‘externalities’’ that
are associated with issues such as
global warming, system
reliability, and market power. In
this regard, SBGI provides
substantial societal benefits in the
form of a reduction in global
warming, improved system
reliability, and at least some
inoculation against the exercise of
market power in deregulated
electricity markets by electricity
providers. However, it is very
difficult for these benefits to be
properly valued in the free
market.
Regarding system reliability,
reducing electricity use in peak
periods through SBGI (e.g.,
demand-response programs)
creates significant external
benefits to the system and its grid
by reducing the amount of
generation and transmission
assets required to provide peak
electric service and thereby
reducing the wholesale price of
peak power on the market.
System reliability may also be
boosted while the market power
of suppliers in the system during
peak times may be reduced.
For example, in a simulation
conducted by the regional
transmission organization PJM, it
was found that curtailing 3
percent of load during the peak1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2007 Elsload period would result in an $8
to $25 per MW reduction in price.
When applied to all loads in the
PJM system, which includes more
than 450 power generators,
transmission owners, and
electricity distributors, the
benefits could range from $65
million to $203 million annually.3
In addition to these perennial
problems, there has been the
emergence of deregulation in
some markets. Deregulation hasmoved the decision to invest in
SBGI solutions into a competitive
market. However, at the same
time, some deregulation schemes
have maintained artificial price
stability in electric prices as part
of the transition agreements. This
has not supported SBGI solutions.A. A classic problemThe problem of properly
valuing SBGI is a classic problem
facing so-called ‘‘non-marketed
goods.’’ Non-marketed goods
include such things as a nation’s
defense umbrella or clean air,
which cannot generally be bought
or sold in a typical market.evier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.T ypically, with a non-marketed good, it is very
easy to calculate the costs of the
good – whether it be missiles for
defense or pollution control
technology for cleaner air.
However, both economists and
accountants have a much more
difficult time putting a value on
the benefits of the good.How, in the
context of this article, do you
accurately measure clean air,
greater reliability of the electricity
system, or the reduction in the risk
of exposure to market power
exercised by electricity providers?
And if you can’t accurately
measure thebenefits, howcan they
possibly be appropriately valued
or monetized by the market
participants?
This is not to say that there are
not methods to make such
calculations. For example,
one of the most useful tools
in this regard is a method
known as contingent valuation.
Contingent valuation is aimed at
estimating the ‘‘willingness to
pay’’ of market participants
through various types of survey
instruments.
Contingent valuationhas awide
range of applications, from
valuing mass transit, forest fire
prevention, and wildlife
preservation to water and air
quality. Nonetheless, the method
itself is controversial, and the
estimates of values that contingent
valuation yields have a wide
variance. The broader point is that
at the core of the problem of an
undersupply of SBGI is the
difficulty inmeasuring the societal
benefits of its provision.tej.2007.07.008 The Electricity Journal
AIV. The ‘‘Free Rider’’
ProblemFigure 1: Supply, Demand, and Price in the SBGI MarketEven if the social benefits of
SBGI can be properly valued,
there is also a phenomenon
known as the free rider problem.
For example, reducing carbon
dioxide emissions and collateral
global warming would help
anyone within the electric utility
system that produces those
reductions. However, it also helps
virtually every one else on the
planet. In a similar vein, one
customer within the systemmight
help to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions or improve the
reliability of the system through
an investment in SBGI. However,
that person is also helping
everybody else on the system,
even those who don’t participate
in any SBGI programs.
The free rider phenomenon is
of particular interest because of
traditional rate-making
principles that are applied to
monopoly industries. These
principles are built upon uniform
access to services and ‘‘postage
stamp rates’’ along with rates
being based on costs incurred.
However the phenomenon is not
unique to this industry and in
fact exists in normal markets.
Suppliers routinely provide
enhancements to their products
that may increase prices. These
enhancements may not be
needed by everyone, but for
efficiency and business purposes
they are designed into the
product. Those that can use the
enhancements receive them at a
cost lower than if they wereug./Sept. 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 7 1040-6190/$–soptions, and those that do not
use the options pay for the right
to use the option anyway. These
types of issues should be a
concern in developing sound
energy policy; the enduring
question is whether regulators or
the application of markets can
better manage such issues so that
society is better off.
G iven the significant freerider problems in the
market for SBGI coupled with the
difficulties in valuing the societal
benefits of SBGI, it is hardly
surprising consumers, utilities,
and third-party providers are
finding it difficult to successfully
monetize the societal benefits. Nor
is it surprising that SBGI is
significantly under-provided by
the marketplace.V. Supply, Demand, and
Equilibrium in the SBGI
MarketFigure 1 illustrates the various
market failures afflicting the
market for SBGI. This figure is
useful because it also provides us
with an understanding of the basic
policy options now beingee front matter# 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rightsproposed by various stakeholders
in the SBGI debate.
The upward sloping supply
curve SPMC represents the
marginal cost of providing
additional increments of SBGI
along the supply curve. In this
case, the private costs consumers
face in this market are equal to the
social costs. That is, there are no
external costs or ‘‘externalities’’
associated with the supply side of
the market. The situation is very
different on the demand side,
however.
The middle demand curve,
DPMB1, represents the demand
curve where consumers have
perfect information in the market
as to the relative costs and benefits
of SBGI and where there is no
capital or institutional constraints
to the implementation of SBGI,
e.g., consumers can freely borrow
at market rates to install solar
panels. The subscript ‘‘PMB’’ in
the labeling is meant to describe
the ‘‘private marginal benefits’’
consumers gain as they incremen-
tally increase their consumption of
SBGI. In this case, equilibrium in
themarket for SBGI occurs at point
A at P1Q1. At this point, however,
SBGI is undersupplied because ofreserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2007.07.008 21
22the presence of positive
externalities associated with the
provision of SBGI.
T he upper demand curveDSMB incorporates those
external benefits into the market
calculus.TheSMB in the labeling is
meant to describe the ‘‘social
marginal benefits,’’ which are
equal to the private marginal
benefits reflected in DPMB1
plus the external benefits
associated with SBGI. As
previously noted, these external
benefits include reduced
environmental impacts from the
substitution of SBGI for central-
station power plants, increased
reliability in the system, increased
energy security, and so on.
If the market were able to
properly account for the
externalities present,
equilibriumwould be at Point B at
P2Q2. In this case, SBGI supplied in
the market increases by the
quantity (Q2–Q1) while
participants in the market
willingly pay the higher costs of
SBGI (P2–P1) because of the
increase in benefits.
Finally, the lowest demand
curve DPMB2 acknowledges the
problems of a possible lack of
perfect information on the part of
market participants and/or
possible capital or institutional
constraints. As previously noted,
in the case of a lack of perfect
information, consumers may not
have adequate knowledge of the
technology options available or
they may not realize the cost–
benefit calculus is favorable. In
the case of capital or institutional
constraints, consumers may not1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2007 Elshave adequate access to capital at
market rates or they may be
renters or they may be owners
who don’t believe they will own
the property long enough to
experience the payback period. In
this case, the market moves even
further from the optimum, with
the new equilibrium at Point C, a
price-quantity combination of
P3Q3, and an undersupply ofSBGI in the market equal to
(Q2–Q3).VI. Policy Options to
Monetize the Value of
SBGIThe preceding economic
analysis provides a useful
framework for thinking
about the problem of how to
encourage more SBGI. In
thinking about this problem, it is
useful to look at it from the
perspective of both the utility and
the consumer.
F rom the utility’s point ofview, the question is this:
‘‘How can the utility create
shareholder value with SBGI?’’evier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.From the consumer’s point of
view, the question is this:
‘‘How can SBGI help to
improve my living environment,
lower my electricity bills, and
increase the reliability of my
service?’’ Note that these two
questions are not necessarily in
conflict if SBGI provides a net gain
relative to the central-station
power plant paradigm and
that these gains can be first
properly valued and then
monetized and distributed to the
various stakeholders. In
answering these questions, it is
useful to consider the following
policy options.A. A carbon tax/government
subsidy programCharging businesses and indivi-
duals a price to emit carbondioxide
(CO2) is essential to reduce U.S.
emissions quickly and steeply
enough to prevent atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 from reach-
ing an irreversible tipping point.
The transformation of our fossil
fuels-based energy system to reli-
ance on energy efficiency,
renewable energy and sustainable
fuels won’t happen without
carbon taxes sending the appro-
priate price signals into every
corner of the economy and every
aspect of life.4
Former Vice President Al Gore
is leading a large chorus of voices
in support of a carbon tax. A
carbon tax would, in the jargon of
the economist, internalize the
pollution externalities associated
with carbondioxide emissionsand
their contribution to global
warming. From the economist’s
point of view, if the price oftej.2007.07.008 The Electricity Journal
Aelectricity does not reflect these
external costs, too much carbon
dioxide will be emitted. A
properly set carbon tax accounts
for these costs.
The politics of a carbon tax are,
however, problematic. The word
tax has historically been a four-
letter word in American politics.
In this particular case, a carbon
tax would raise the price of
electricity and therefore likely
encounter significant political
resistance. It is perhaps for this
reason that some carbon tax
advocates argue that the revenues
from a carbon tax should be
rebated to the poor to avoid
any regressive elements of the
carbon tax.
The carbon tax assigns a specific
cost to the production of CO2.
Since this cost is known, the utility
planners can make efficient
decisions on minimizing the
costs, and as a result carbon
emitted into the air. The cost
of the carbon produced would be
passed on to the consumers of
energy. Utility shareholders
would benefit from a return on
investments for carbon reduction
equipment.
A s a further comment on theuse of the carbon tax
revenues, there is significant
debate over whether a
government-run program is
the best way for instituting
change. That debate put aside,
directing carbon tax revenues
towards the development of
more efficient energy-producing
and energy-using technologies
and energy reduction programs
could lead to innovation andug./Sept. 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 7 1040-6190/$–seconomic development in the
communities served by the
utilities.
Going back to Figure 1, a
consumer subsidy equal to P2–P1
for SBGI would successfully
internalize the SBGI positive
externalities – which represent a
mirror image of the negative
externalities associated with
carbon emissions.B. A carbon cap with
emissions tradingAs an alternative to the
carbon tax, some analysts
have proposed a ‘‘carbon cap’’
with emissions trading. Under
such a system, the regulatory
authorities – either state or federal
– would establish limits on carbon
emissions. Those entities, such as
electric utilities or steel producers,
who failed to meet the cap would
pay a penalty. In contrast, those
entities which came in under the
cap would be granted tradable
credits.
In order for a carbon cap with
emissions trading system to be
successful, it is essential that the
cap be set at a level restrictiveee front matter# 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rightsenough toelicitmeaningful carbon
emission reductions. However,
the experience to date with carbon
caps has not been encouraging.
Under the Kyoto Treaty, Europe
established a pilot program in
carbon trading. Under intense
lobbying pressure from industry,
the caps were set too high for the
participants, and carbon emissions
actually rose rather than fell under
the program. The broader point
here is that the politics of this
particular solution are equally
difficult, albeit for a totally
different reason.
A carbon cap and emissions
trading policy allows the market
to set the value of carbon emission
reductions. The freedom to
exchange credits and monetize
their value provides added
flexibility for planners,
rewards those that invest to
reduce carbon and those that can
react quickly taking advantage of
the higher credit values. This
approach could also be applied to
SBGI programs to provide
monetary value for carbon
reduction.C. Mandated levels and
performance incentivesTraditional regulation offers an
equally traditional zero-sumgame
between ratepayers and
shareholders on the SBGI issue.
The ‘‘stick’’ approach is for the
regulatory authorities to mandate
certain levels of SBGI. For
example, in Figure 1, the
regulatory authorities might
mandate a level of Q2. This
technology-forcing approachreserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2007.07.008 23
24would require utilities to find the
most efficient ways of meeting the
mandates. If rates are set in a
proper fashion, the rates will
reflect the higher costs, including a
return on SBGI assets, which will
be passed on, at least in part, to
consumers.
T he ‘‘carrot’’ approach is touse a performance-based
ratemaking approach to offer
utilities a higher rate of return on
SBGI investment if specific
performance targets are met. In
effect, this would represent a
subsidy of SBGI activity that
would benefit both utility
shareholders and consumers as
well as the broader society while
allowing the utilities to monetize
part of the benefits. To the extent
that this policy encourages SBGI
above the cost-effective level, it
will allow the utility to monetize
some of the societal benefits
through a return on investment
and incentives if they apply.
It should be noted here that
both options would entail
substantial conflict between
ratepayer and shareholder groups
over the setting of the targets.D. Public information and
capital lending programsThe goal of any public
information and capital lending
programs would be to move the
demand curve in Figure 1 from
DPMB2 toDPMB1. In this regard, it is
an open question as to how many
property owners fail to invest in
SBGI even when such investment
‘‘pencils’’ from an economic point
of view. Clearly, more research is1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2007 Elsneeded in this area. If the number
is a big number, allocating
resources to more public
information programs might
significantly boost SBGI.
At the same time, it would be
useful for the utility industry to
finance research that examined
the question as to whether
SBGI investments are properly
valued in the real estatemarket. Inthis regard, ‘‘hedonic pricing
models’’ commonly used in real
estate analysis are able to put a
price on amenities such as views,
school quality, number of
bedrooms, and the crime rate. It
would be useful to see if such
models also demonstrate a
proper valuation of amenities
such as solar panels and EE
investment. If the answer is
in the affirmative, such
information could be
incorporated into any public
information campaign.
I t is an equally interestingresearch question as to how
many consumers fail to adopt
SBGI because of capital
constraints. More information is
clearly needed on this subject. Ifevier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.the capital constraint is
significant, utilities might
consider an enhanced loan
program focused on SBGI
reducing investments. This will
reduce the SBGI capital market
barrier. The outstanding loan
balances could be treated as a
regulatory asset enhancing utility
earnings, as well as it would
reflect the cost of carbon reducing
investments in energy prices.VII. ConclusionsThe utility industry is in the
midst of amajor transformation to
respond to the changing values of
its customers and the community
it serves. This transformation
requires utilities to integrate
SBGI, as well as traditional
investments, into their business
decisions to meet customer and
regulatory needs. Monetizing the
value of SBGI is complex and will
play an important role in this
transformation. Since this
transformation is in its infancy, a
common or agreed-to approach
for monetization has yet to be
developed. However a number of
options are being considered.
These options have numerous
barriers, the most difficult being
the political barriers associated
with such a transformational
undertaking. However, increased
awareness of the environmental
and climate impacts of CO2 levels
provides a unique opportunity to
make these transformational
changes.
A key question in making the
transformational changes is whattej.2007.07.008 The Electricity Journal
Arole regulators will play. They are
uniquely positioned as an arbiter
between the community and the
investor. They have an
opportunity to establish policies
and provide guidance to the
markets and utilities, establish
guidelines for the establishment of
mechanisms (e.g., taxes, markets,
etc.) thatwould establish the value
of SBGIs and monetizationWill re
ug./Sept. 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 7 1040-6190/$–sapproaches, and assure investors
that there will be appropriate
rewards for their risks to establish
an adequate level of capital
investment in SBGIs. Critical for
successfully monetizing the value
of SBGI investments is that the
rules be established so that the risk
is known and action can be taken.
Will the regulators and the
industry stepup to the challenge?&gulators and the industry step up to the challe
ee front matter# 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rightsEndnotes:
1. NERC Forecast: 22 Necessary Actions
Required to Save U.S. Electric Grid, cited
in Marsha Freeman, EXEC. INTELLIGENCE
REV., Oct. 27, 2006.
2. Id.
3. Brattle Group, Quantifying Demand
Response Benefits in PJM, Jan. 29, 2007,
at 2.
4. Carbon Tax Center, at http://
www.carbontax.org/faq/.nge?
reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2007.07.008 25
